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CLASS, PARTY, AND RACE IN FOUR TYPES OF ELECTIONS--THE CASE OF ATLANTA.

JENNINGS, M. KENT * ZEIGLER, HARMON
RQR60230 UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, EUGENE

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THE VOTING RESULTS OF 13 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES, PARTISAN, NONPARTISAN, AND REFERENDUMS ELECTIONS HELD BETWEEN 1954 AND 1964 IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA, WERE STUDIED TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF PARTY AFFILIATION, CLASS COMPOSITION, AND RACE. THIS STUDY WAS A REPLICATION OF THE MAIN PORTIONS OF A DES MOINES STUDY (SEPTEMBER, 1963) AND RELATED THE RESULTS OF ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS ON--(1) THE COMPARISON OF INTERELECTION VOTING RESULTS, (2) THE STATUS POLARIZATION IN THE ELECTORATE, (3) THE CHANGING NATURE OF ETHNIC VOTING, AND (4) THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VOTING AND RULING COALITIONS IN ATLANTA. COMPREHENSIVE DESCRIPTIONS WERE PRESENTED OF THESE VARIOUS VOTING FACTORS IN EACH OF THE FOUR TYPES OF ELECTIONS. RESULTS INDICATED THAT THE VARIABLE OF CLASS COMPOSITION AFFECTED ELECTION RESULTS LEAST. (PM)

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CLASS, PARTY, AND RACE IN FOUR TYPES OF ELECTIONS: THE CASE OF ATLANTA*

By

M. Kent Jennings
University of Michigan

and

Harmon Zeigler
University of Oregon

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In a recent study of voting in Des Moines, Iowa, Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black assessed the effects of party affiliation and class composition on voting results in three kinds of elections--partisan, nonpartisan, and referenda.[1] They found that party affiliation accounted for more of the variation than did class in partisan elections, a finding of no great surprise but one which underlines again the inordinate emphasis placed on social class groupings by some of the early voting studies. The authors also reported that party loomed more important than did class in local nonpartisan elections although the range of variation was greater than for partisan contests.[2] This is a finding of some moment and goes to the heart of the question concerning the significance of parties and partisans in de jure nonpartisan systems and to the articulation of local with state and national politics. Finally, the Des Moines study indicated no strong relationships between either party or class and the vote in three out of four referenda (the exception being a vote on the city manager plan).[3] This too

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[1] "Class and Party in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," American Political Science Review, 57 (September, 1963), 584-92.

[2] A similar finding is reported in Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy-Making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), chapter 4. For a review and interpretation of the relation of nonpartisanship, in general, to the party system, see Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 226-38. See also Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).

[3] However, in their four-city study Williams and Adrian report moderate to strong correlations between party and class and the support of council-sponsored referenda. Williams and Adrian, chapter 5. A study of referenda in the Cleveland area revealed a negative correlations between Democratic voting and pro-metropolitan integration proposals, but the average "yes" vote on 45 referenda showed no meaningful correlation with Democratic voting. James A. Norton, "Referenda Voting in a Metropolitan Area," Western Political Quarterly, 16 (March, 1963), 195-212.

touches on the important questions of the programmatic or nonprogrammatic nature of local politics, and the interplay of class and party interests (whether latent or manifest) in the local political system.

The authors of the Des Moines report wisely suggested that their findings should be regarded as specific to that city, and urged further analysis of other cities. In response to this suggestion and as part of a continuing research interest,[4] we have undertaken a partial replication of that study in the city of Atlanta, Georgia. One may immediately say that comparisons between Atlanta and Des Moines will surely produce discrepancies because of the obvious differences of the political cultures involved. This, of course, is precisely the point. The advancement of knowledge and theory about urban political systems, both as locales of extra-city politics and as political entities unto themselves, comes only with the observation of similar variables at work in different settings.

In addition to reporting on the replication of the main portions of the Des Moines study, we shall also relate the results of additional analysis. Specifically, we shall present a comparison of interelection voting results, the presence of status polarization in the electorate, the changing nature of ethnic voting, and the interrelationships between voting coalitions and ruling coalitions in Atlanta.

Research Procedures

We have selected for examination thirteen elections held in Atlanta

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[4]See the writers' "A Moderate's Victory in a Southern Congressional District," Public Opinion Quarterly, (Winter, 1964); "Campaign Strategies and Voting Patterns in a Southern Congressional District," in Jennings and Zeigler (eds.), Essays in the Electoral Process (forthcoming); and Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, Voting Patterns in a Local Election (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964).

between 1954 and 1964. They may be divided into four types:

A. Partisan (4) -- 1956 and 1960 Presidential; 1956 and 1962 Congressional.[5]

B. Democratic primaries (4) -- 1954 and 1962 congressional (5th district); 1958 and 1962 gubernatorial.

C. Nonpartisan local (2) -- 1957 general and 1961 run-off primary mayoralty.[6]

D. Referenda (3) -- 1962 and 1963 bond issues;[7] 1964 legal liquor (by the glass).

Thus we have the three kinds of contests used in the Des Moines study (though not as many of each kind) plus an additional one--Democratic primaries. It should be noted that Georgia had, until recently, an open primary system for partisan offices, which in practice means a Democratic primary. The electorates for primary and general elections are potentially the same and, aside from differential rates of turnout, this has apparently facilitated a fairly high degree of overlap between primary and general balloting.

Electoral results in these 13 elections for each of Atlanta's 69 pre-

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[5]These were the only elections covering the entire city in the ten-year period which were seriously contested by both parties.

[6]Mayoralty contests were utilized because, like the city council elections in Des Moines--where the mayor is selected by the council--these were considered the most significant nonpartisan local elections.

[7]There was also a bond referendum in 1957 but, unfortunately for our purposes, the precinct returns were not preserved. We also found in related research, that the gubernatorial primary returns of 1962 had not been recorded by precinct level in neighboring DeKalb County. Such occurrences should serve as an admonition to scholars and researchers to acquire such data at the time they are available and to encourage local governing bodies to establish voting archives.

cincts constitute the dependent variables.[8] The independent variables include the two used in the Des Moines--class and party--plus the additional one of race. The operational procedures require some explanation, especially since none are exactly the same as those used in the Des Moines research. Utilizing census tract data, a measure of class was constructed from three components: the percentage of persons twenty-five years of age and over with no more than eighth grade education; the percentage of families with incomes of $5,000 or less; and the percentage of males fourteen years of age and older employed in an unskilled occupation. An average of these three measures was taken and then subtracted from 100. This produced an index score in which the higher scores indicate higher class (or socio-economic) status. Since census tracts and precincts do not coincide, it was necessary to superimpose census tract maps upon precinct maps and estimate the overlap.[9] In this fashion, each of the 69 precincts was assigned a score on the class index. Due to the generally high intercorrelations of socio-economic indicators, we believe that this measure is reasonably comparable to the housing index used in the Des Moines study.[10]

The construction of the measure of partisanship presents some difficulties in a traditionally one-party state. In addition, since Georgia

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[8] In a few cases, precinct boundaries were altered for specific elections. This usually meant combining adjacent precincts for polling purposes. Approximations for the "missing precincts" were developed.

[9] For the method employed see Walter Kaufman and Scott Greer, "Voting in a Metropolitan Community: An Application of Social Area Analysis," Social Forces, 28 (March, 1960), 196-204.

[10] We did find in related research, however, that the use of a housing index developed from Bureau of the Census data did not prove as discriminating a measure in the Atlanta area as did the class index we developed.

used open primaries during the period under analysis, there are no registration figures by party. As a surrogate for party registration (the measure used by Salisbury and Black), we constructed an index of partisan voting which we label the Democratic Vote Index. This index is the average of the percent Democratic vote for each precinct in the 1956 and 1962 Congressional elections and the 1956 and 1960 Presidential elections. Thus our measure of partisanship is simply a mean party vote. By using the results of four elections, we sought to minimize the impact of short term factors inherent in relying on a single election and to present a reasonable approximation of the "average" partisan loyalties of a precinct. In view of the generally high correlation between party registration and party identification on the one hand, and the direction of the vote in partisan elections on the other, the Democratic index may be presumed to be a valid indicator of <u>national</u> party affiliation among the <u>voters</u> of these precincts. Index scores reflect the substantial inroads the Republican candidates have made in partisan elections--the range is from a low of a 26% average Democratic vote in one precinct to a high of 75% in another, with the median being 61%, and the mean 57%. Hence, it is no fanciful or misleading venture in statistical manipulation to speak of a partisan voting index in Atlanta.

Our third independent variable, race, was not used in the Des Moines study due to the paucity of non-Caucasians in the mid-Western city (5% in 1960). In Atlanta, however, any analysis of electoral behavior would be inadequate without a consideration of Negro participation in elections. As Jack Walker has shown,[11] Negro registration increased dramatically after the white primary was outlawed. Since mid-1946, the (estimated) percentage

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[11]"Negro Voting in Atlanta: 1954-61," <u>Phylon</u>, 24 (No. 4, 1963), 379-87.

of Negro registrants out of all registered voters in the city of Atlanta has never dropped below 25%, and in 1962 the proportion stood at 34%. Moreover, there is a strong suggestion, in mayoralty elections at least, that the Negroes turn out in higher proportions than do whites, and that (again in mayoralty elections) they vote more cohesively than do whites. Inclusion of the racial composition of the precincts is thus crucial in sorting out the effects of class and party as well as being of inherent interest in terms of ethnic voting. The operational measure of racial composition, again using census tract data, was the percentage of the precinct described as non-Caucasian.[12]

We shall first consider the association between these three variables--class, party, and race--and electoral outcomes in four kinds of elections. The modes of analysis will be simple and partial product-moment correlations. Although we present both simple and partial correlation coefficients in the tables, our discussion will rest primarily on the partials.

Voting Behavior in Four Types of Elections

Partisan elections.

In examining partisan elections we have related the three independent variables to the percentage of the vote for Democratic candidates. Table 1 presents these findings. In a superficially non-competitive city we find that the partisan variable has occasionally powerful, but highly flexible, explanatory ability. It should be noted that the correlation between the

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[12]Registration figures are available by race but since we were interested in characterizing the precinct as a whole, and not just the registered voters, and since census data were employed to develop the class index, we have relied on census data to classify the precincts by racial composition.

Table 1

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THREE VARIABLES AND PER CENT DEMOCRATIC VOTE IN FOUR PARTISAN ELECTIONS

	Democratic Index		Class Index		% Negro	
	Simple r	Partial r*	Simple r	Partial r*	Simple r	Partial r*
1956 Congressional	.92	(.87)	.13	(-.15)	-.64	(-.52)
1956 Presidential	.89	(.80)	.15	(-.76)	-.64	(-.42)
1960 Presidential	.66	(.38)	.33	(-.15)	-.44	(-.24)
1962 Congressional	.26	(.47)	-.74	(-.17)	.57	(.40)

*Partial correlations are with the two remaining variables controlled.

Democratic Index and per cent Democratic vote may be increased unnaturally because of the fact that one-fourth of the independent variable is compiled from the dependent variable.

The most striking fact about the correlations between the Democratic Index and the Democratic vote is that they have declined as political competition has increased. In 1956 Democratic candidates did quite well in both Congressional and Presidential elections. In spite of the "nonpartisan appeal" of Eisenhower, Stevenson received a considerable party vote. In this same year, a Republican challenge to congressional incumbent James C. Davis produced little defection. It is in the 1960's that the sharp drop in correlation occurs. The low correlation in the 1960 election, as compared with the 1956 Presidential election, indicates that Kennedy was clearly less acceptable than was Stevenson in the Democratically-inclined precincts. (And the correlation between the Stevenson and Kennedy vote is .65, not a particularly high relationship considering the office at stake.) Also, in the 1962 Congressional election a moderate Democrat scored better against his Republican opponent than Kennedy did against Nixon, but not as well as the Democratic candidate in 1956. The data do not, then, reveal a stable and reliable party vote, but rather suggest a volatile one which depends more upon circumstances and candidates than party loyalty.

As we shall see, the decline in correlation can probably be explained by the increase in the liberal image of Democratic candidates and, perhaps, the militancy of the civil rights movement. Kennedy's clear support of civil rights legislation can be contrasted with Stevenson's more ambiguous position. Congressional candidates also have appeared more liberal than in the past. It is difficult, then, to establish a "normal" Democratic vote for elections. Unlike Des Moines, where Salisbury and Black found a stable

party vote, candidates in Atlanta cannot be as assured of a consistent base of support dependent upon tradition. Further, the more a Democratic candidate assumes a "national" posture, the less will be his chances of holding his strength in traditionally Democratic precincts.

The class index, with a single deviant election (1956 Presidential), is a much more stable predictor of electoral behavior albeit a less powerful one. With the exception noted above, which produced a substantial negative correlation between class and Democratic vote, this index has little explanatory value. However, the direction of the correlations is hypothetically "correct," since the indication is that Democratic vote declines as class increases. The curious aspect of these data is the fact that the class variable is, with the one exception, so feeble in comparison to Des Moines. It is apparent that there are some forces impacting upon class proclivities in Atlanta. Those forces are probably sectionalism and race. The muting of class conflict by sectional loyalties is a familiar theme in political science literature and one which is apparently supported by the Atlanta data.[13] Significantly, there has been no pattern of change in these negative correlations. If the correlations were to increase, this would presumably indicate a decline in sectionalism. By the same token the cleavages between lower class white elements and the predominantly lower class Negro population minimize wholesale class cleavages.

The behavior of the Negro precincts may appear surprising, as first glance, in that in three of the four elections under consideration negative correlations are produced between per cent Negro and the Democratic vote. Indeed the overall partial correlation between per cent Negro and Democratic index,

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[13]Robert Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), 237.

with class controlled, is -.76. The Republican party, during the Eisenhower years, held considerable fascination for Atlanta's Negroes; sizeable Republican majorities were turned in by predominantly Negro precincts during these years. In Congressional politics, the segregationist posture of southern Democrats during the 1950's, in all probability, accounted for the negative correlations. It was not until the 1962 Congressional campaign that a reduction in Negro Congressional Republicanism was achieved, and this development can be attributed to the Democratic candidate's abandonment of the traditional southern position on civil rights. Whether the trend continues depends, obviously, upon the postures of Democratic candidates.

These findings are in contrast to the data collected by Donald Matthews and James Prothro. They found that southern Negroes are overwhelmingly biased in favor of the Democratic party and that they voted far more heavily in favor of Kennedy than did the whites.[14] Since the Matthews and Prothro study was one of the entire region, it is probable that the disparity between our findings and theirs is due to the fact that Atlanta Negroes are more Republican than other southern and rural Negroes. Atlanta may be a unique southern phenomenon. On the other hand, other local deviations from the Matthews-Prothro finding that 75 per cent of the southern Negroes voted for Kennedy can be found. In Tallahassee, for example, about 51 per cent of the Negroes preferred Kennedy.[15]

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[14]Donald Matthews and James Prothro. "Southern Images of Political Parties: An Analysis of Negro and White Attitudes," Journal of Politics, 26 (February, 1964), 82-111.

[15]Russell Middleton, "The Civil Rights Issue and Presidential Voting Among Southern Negroes and Whites," Social Forces, 40 (March, 1962), 211.

Democratic primary elections.

In looking at these primaries, we relate our three variables to the percentage of the vote for the more liberal of the two major candidates. Here we see that class becomes a more significant variable than in partisan elections (see Table 2). In two of the elections under analysis, class is of equal or greater significance than is party. Although primary elections were not examined in the Des Moines study, little difference was found between partisan and nonpartisan elections. In the South class may be more important in primaries than in general contests because of the fact that primary elections are more crucial to the electorate and offer more genuine choices. In a sense, we can learn more about the ideology of a precinct by examining its votes in primary and nonpartisan elections rather than in partisan ones.

More significant than the size and variation in the correlations is the fact that in every case there is a negative correlation between Democratic strength and vote for the more liberal candidate. The strongest Democratic precincts are low-income white (the partial correlation between the class and the Democratic indexes, with race controlled, is -.70) vigorously segregationist and, as we shall see, conservative in local affairs. In examining Table 2 one is struck by the aptness of Banfield and Wilson's comment that "...the words 'Republican' and 'Democratic' do not necessarily mean the same thing in local as in state and national politics. Sometimes, indeed, the meanings are (so far as they have application to the local situation) reversed. That the Democratic party is more 'liberal' than the Republican in national affairs does not prevent it from being more 'conservative,' or even 'reactionary,' in the affairs of some cities."[16]

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[16]Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 225.

Table 2

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THREE VARIABLES AND PER CENT VOTE FOR THE MORE LIBERAL CANDIDATE IN FOUR DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY CONTESTS

	Democratic Index		Class Index		% Negro	
	Simple r	Partial r*	Simple r	Partial r*	Simple r	Partial r*
1954 Congressional	-.60	(-.42)	-.47	(-.11)	.77	(.36)
1958 Gubernatorial	.11	(-.37)	.86	(.50)	.83	(-.41)
1962 Gubernatorial	-.79	(-.44)	-.69	(.49)	.61	(.63)
1962 Congressional	-.66	(-.42)	-.47	(.24)	.88	(.74)

*Partial correlations are with the two remaining variables controlled.

The generally positive association between per cent Negro and the vote for more liberal Democrats is similar to that found according to the class variable and counter to that existing for the Democratic index. There are exceptions. A slight negative partial correlation in the 1954 Congressional primary mars an otherwise clear pattern according to class. It is hard to explain this deviant case without indulging in sheer speculation. The assumption among Atlanta politicians is that the candidate's Jewish religion reduced his support in upper-class areas.

Less puzzling is the negative partial correlation by race in the 1958 gubernatorial primary. Notice that the simple correlation between % Negro and a liberal vote is extremely positive, but that the association becomes negative when class and Democratic index are controlled. This is primarily because the liberal ran up such a lopsided victory in all of Atlanta's precincts and because a minor candidate attracted some of the "Negro" votes. The winning candidate, Ernest Vandiver, was a liberal only by comparison with the main opposition, W. T. Bodenhamer, a racial extremist. Vandiver ran as a strict segregationist, pledged to prevent (by legal means) the entrance of a single Negro into a white school. While Vandiver scored a smashing victory in Atlanta, his majorities in predominately Negro precincts were his lowest in the city. He received an average vote of 74% in the Negro precincts as compared with about 86% of the votes in the white precincts.[17] Yet it was during Vandiver's administration that the University of Georgia was integrated without interference from the Governor's office. From this episode Vandiver's image became that of a "reasonable" Southerner.

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[17]It seems likely that this curious pattern is also partly a consequence of working with grouped data. Operational procedures for classifying the precincts by race and class for grouping purposes are given in Table 8.

In 1962, Carl Sanders, running on a platform of open schools, defeated arch-segregationist Marvin Griffin, former governor of the state. Sanders proposed policies roughly comparable to those of Vandiver, and the assumption was that Sanders ran with Vandiver's support. Sanders appeared to be carrying on the Vandiver tradition. However, while the policies of the successive administrations are similar, the political support for the two men was dissimilar. Sanders' average vote in Negro precincts (94%) was considerably higher than in white precincts (67%).

Mayoralty elections.

Local elections are legally nonpartisan in Atlanta. We now consider two significant mayoralty contests--the 1957 and 1961 contests in which moderates prevailed over the extremist, Lester Maddox. Table 3 indicates that the Democratic index is roughly as powerful in nonpartisan local elections as it is in either of the two partisan elections of the 1960's. Further, party is slightly more significant than class in these nonpartisam elections and is about as significant as racial composition. This situation clearly does not support the traditional assumption that nonpartisan elections mask party orientations and that cleavages will fall along non-party lines.[18] True, Atlanta's nonpartisan elections have not been characterized by a "behind-the scenes" type of party activity. Certainly, Atlanta stands in stark contrast to J. Leiper Freeman's "Bay City," in which local candidates are supported by groups closely paralleling national party organizations.[19]

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[18]These assumptions appeared most frequently in texts, although empirical studies had reached opposite conclusions at least twenty years ago. See, for example, Calvin F. Schmid, Social Trends in Seattle (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1944).

[19]J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (November, 1958), 282-289.

Table 3

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THREE VARIABLES AND PER CENT VOTE FOR THE MORE LIBERAL CANDIDATE IN TWO NONPARTISAN MAYORALTY ELECTIONS

	Democratic Index		Class Index		% Negro	
	Simple r	Partial r**	Simple r	Partial r**	Simple r	Partial r**
1957*	-.82	(-.55)	-.45	(.35)	.56	(.49)
1961*	-.76	(-.43)	-.80	(.35)	.58	(.50)

*For 1957 this is the percentage of the vote for William Hartsfield, the winner, and in 1961 this is the percentage for Ivan Allen, also the winner.

**Partial correlations are with the two remaining variables controlled.

An alternative explanation, then, is that the more "Democratic" the precinct, the more it is populated by people with a tenacious addiction to the status quo, that there is an ideology common to them which sets them apart from less Democratic precincts. Hence, in mayoralty contests we find a consistent negative correlation between Democratic strength and the vote for more liberal candidates, a pattern we also observed in Democratic primaries. Atlanta is apparently quite similar to Des Moines in that both cities reveal a substantial correlation between partisan variables and votes in nonpartisan elections.

The mayoralty elections offer vital clues concerning the underpinnings of the "coalition" that has governed Atlanta since Mayor William Hartsfield's emergence as a racial moderate following World War II. The negative correlations between the vote for more liberal candidates and Democratic voting is off-set by the positive correlations prevailing for class and per cent Negro. Since the emergence of Negroes as voters and since the 1954 Brown versus Board of Education decision, the racial issue has been a basic focus for conflict in Atlanta. Mayor Hartsfield and his successor, Ivan Allen, have depended upon the support of middle to upper-income whites and Negroes to counter the violent opposition of lower and middle-income whites. Both candidates have apparently lost the majority of the white votes in recent elections. We might, therefore, say that the more Democratic the precinct is the more anti-coalition it is in local politics.

Another aspect of the voting behavior which should be noticed is the fact that the correlations between votes for liberal candidates and class index are lower than are the correlations between moderate candidates and per cent Negro. Perhaps this is due to the fact that Atlanta's Negroes are unusually well-organized by the Atlanta Negro Voter's League, which is

normally able to generate considerable enthusiasm and unity for whom it perceives to be the most satisfactory candidate. The bloc-voting characteristic of Negro precincts in mayoralty contests is not as prevalent among even the very pro-moderate upper class white precincts.

Referenda.

The pivotal role of Negroes in Atlanta's elections can also be seen quite clearly by examining three local referenda (see Table 4). The 1962 bond program was Mayor Allen's first attempt to implement a program to which he had committed himself during his campaign. It suffered a rather clear defeat which was rightly interpreted by the anti-coalition leaders as a major victory for them.[20] Mayor Allen was anxious that this defeat be erased as soon as possible, and in 1963 his desires were fulfilled in the successful passage of a sharply-reduced bond program. Notice that in these two bond elections the correlations between Democratic proclivities and affirmative vote are consistently and substantially negative; the correlations between class and a favorable vote are consistently low and positive; but the correlations between per cent Negro and affirmative vote are positive and show a noticeable increase.

It is certainly true that the increased support given to the bond issue by Negro electorates was a crucial factor in the success of Mayor Allen's program. In the predominantly Negro precincts, the favorable vote increased from 58% to 81%; in the upper class white precincts from 47% to 61%; in the middle class precincts from 30% to 46%; and it increased in the lower class

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[20]An essential part of the campaign against the bond issues was that the money was to be spent for integrated facilities. Recreational facilities were especially singled out in this accusation.

Table 4

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THREE VARIABLES AND THE PER CENT AFFIRMATIVE VOTE ON THREE REFERENDA

	Democratic Index		Class Index		% Negro	
	Simple r	Partial r*	Simple r	Partial r*	Simple r	Partial r*
1962 Bond Program	-.78	(-.52)	.27	(.22)	.45	(.30)
1963 Bond Program	-.78	(-.52)	-.12	(.25)	.60	(.45)
1964 Legal Liquor	-.82	(-.49)	.01	(.21)	.42	(.31)

*Partial correlations are with the two remaining variables controlled.

white precincts from 26% to 43%. Thus it is evident that the bond issue program of 1963 was much more favorably received in all the strata of the community, but that the overwhelming support of Negroes was not matched by that of any other group. The careful negotiations between Mayor Allen and the leaders of the Negro community were, if the elections can be used as a guide, not in vain.

Also to be noted is the very obvious place of Republicanism in Atlanta's progressive voting pattern. Among the white groups, the Republican upper-income voters are those which are most likely to support "progressive" movements. Some support for a similar situation was discovered in Des Moines and, in fact, most studies of local politics have concluded that Republican upper-income voters are far more likely to support progressive issues and candidates than are lower-income Democratic voters.[21] Opinions in regard to increased expenditures at the national level are not necessarily consonant with those at the local level.

A final clue to the nature of the opposing factions in Atlanta can be gathered by an examiniation of the 1964 vote on legal liquor. The fundamentalist morality of the lower class areas may be contrasted sharply with the more worldly views of the upper class white areas and the Negro areas. The Negro precincts gave the referendum a 78% favorable vote in contrast to the 48% vote in the lower class white precincts. High class white precincts were second in degree of support with 66%. Unlike the bond elections, there were no fears of integration raised. Even though the vote on legal liquor had no overt relationship to race relations, a vote against legal liquor was clearly a part of the same complex prompting the anti-bond votes. Thus,

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[21] See particularly Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 234-40; and Williams and Adrian, op cit., chapter 5.

even without the race question, the negative correlations between Democratic strength and affirmative vote decline only slightly in the legal liquor referendum. Further, a vote against legal liquor fits neatly into the fundamentalist assumptions of the white Protestant South. The preachers in fundamentalist churches scattered throughout the lower class white areas frequently attack integration and other presumed sins, such as drinking, in the same sermon.

These elections suggest that the voting alliances in Atlanta are stable with regard to <u>local</u> politics. In fact, coalition voting patterns are firmer than party affiliation in partisan elections. The local coalitions in Atlanta appear to be more stable than those of Des Moines. In nonpartisan elections, there are strong relationships between party, class, and vote in both cities. However, in referenda the relationships between these variables and vote are generally lower in Des Moines than in Atlanta. In Atlanta, while the correlations are lower in referenda than in mayoralty elections, they are subject to far less fluctuation than is the case in Des Moines. Thus, while mayoralty elections produce the higher correlations, referenda elections do not disrupt the established pattern.

Looking at the Atlanta elections in overview, we can see that class is easily the weakest variable in each of the four types of elections. The other two variables appear to be about equal in explanatory power with party the more important in partisan elections and referenda. In Democratic primary elections racial composition is more important than party while in mayoralty contests the two are closely matched. If we examine the ranges of the correlations we observe that, in the case of each variable, the ranges are greatest in partisan elections and generally least in local elections.

The general insignificance of class, in contrast to the powerful role

of party, is a point to be emphasized. The correlations between party and vote persist when class is controlled. With regard to referenda, party is a much more significant variable in Atlanta than in Des Moines. In partisan elections, however, "party" vote fluctuates more in Atlanta than in Des Moines where partisan candidates receive a predictable vote. Salisbury and Black speculate upon the possibility of reducing the predictive value of party and increasing the predictable value of class by adding measures of income and occuaption to their class index. The Salisbury-Black measure of social class is based on housing, whereas ours includes education, occupation, and income. Yet, even though our measure of social class is presumably more precise than that of Salisbury and Black, this measure does not succeed in increasing the predictive power of class-related variables.

The Multiple Effects of Class, Party, and Race.

To what extent do the three independent variables we have been dealing with explain or account for the total variation in voting returns in various types of elections? Combining the three variables, multiple correlation coefficients (R) and then multiple coefficients of determination (R^2) were computed for each of the thirteen elections. The coefficients of determination reveal the percentage variation in the vote accounted for by the variables; these are the figures presented in Table 5.

While the explanatory power of class, party, and race fluctuates somewhat, this power is generally of a very strong magnitude. In ten of the thirteen elections the variation accounted for is over 70% and in no case is the figure below 50%. As Donald Matthews and James Prothro note in another context, "To explain over one-fourth of the variance in Negro registration--or any other significant political phenomenon--is no mean achievement in

Table 5

PERCENTAGE OF VOTE VARIATION (R^2) ACCOUNTED FOR BY CLASS, PARTY, AND RACE IN FOUR TYPES OF ELECTIONS

Partisan elections	% of Variation accounted for	Nonpartisan elections	% of Variation accounted for
1956 Congressional	93	1957 Mayoralty	81
1956 Presidential	85	1961 Mayoralty	89
1960 Presidential	54		
1962 Congressional	71		
Democratic primaries		Referenda	
1954 Congressional	75	1962 Bond	67
1958 Gubernatorial	84	1963 Bond	72
1962 Gubernatorial	89	1964 Legal Liquor	53
1962 Congressional	90		

the current state of political science."[22] Even if we were to discard the partisan elections because the independent variable of partisanship is derived in part from the dependent variable of voting outcome--although, as we have shown, the party vote is unstable in Atlanta--we would still retain impressive figures for the three other types of elections.

It is significant that the category of elections in which the least variations are explained are the referenda votes. Party, class, and race do not provide the cognitive and attitudinal reference points when the vote is on proposals that they do when candidates are at stake. Referenda are sufficiently episodic and unique to inhibit (but not erase) the habitual behavioral patterns operative when candidates structure the alternatives. Again, while referenda in Atlanta do not produce the intense reference points characterizing other types of elections, the evidence suggests that referenda are more a part of the local voting pattern in Atlanta than in Des Moines. The coefficients of determination are higher in Atlanta than in Des Moines; they are also less out of line with the average coefficients. Then, the coefficients of determination in Atlanta referenda decrease from 10 to 20 per cent in comparison with other elections; in Des Moines they decrease about 40%. Similarly, in the 1960 presidential contest there were factors at work not clearly identified with class, party, or race--primarily the religious issue, of course--which served to diminish the explanatory force of the three variables.

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[22]"Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," American Political Science Review, 57 (March, 1963), 42. Emphasis added.

Interelection Comparisons

Most commonly comparisons of voting results from the same political unit have dealt with similar or related elections over time (e.g., factional support in party primaries, primary and general elections outcomes, and so forth).[23] Less often, comparisons are drawn between different kinds of elections (e.g., partisan versus nonpartisan). The latter have the advantage of viewing the responses of the same electoral units to presumably quite different sets of stimuli. We shall focus on comparisons of this type.

From the material presented thus far, one might conclude that there may be persistent patterns characterizing the distribution of precinct balloting in Atlanta. For example, it seems likely--in view of the strong correlations produced by either class, party, or race--that there would be high intercorrelations in the voting for moderate mayoralty candidates and for "progressive" referenda. On the other hand, the "mix" of electoral components may be sufficiently different to minimize such positive relationships.

As a first step, let us consider the data which bear on the example just offered. The coefficients of correlation presented in Table 6 indicate remarkably high associations. There is no doubt that the contour of voting aligned with Hartsfield was followed by a similar one for his successor in 1961, Ivan Allen. And the profile of voting support in those two elections is patterned after those for the three referenda, with the latter in turn being highly associated with each other. Hence, the electorates tended to behave similarly in regard to two different types of local elections--nonpartisan and referenda. To a certain extent all five elections contained the common elements of moderation versus intolerance on the race issue,

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[23] Such work is most often associated with V. O. Key, Jr. See especially his American State Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956).

Table 6

INTERELECTION CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE
IN REFERENDA AND VOTE FOR LIBERAL MAYORALTY CANDIDATES

	1957 Mayoralty	1961 Mayoralty	1962 Bond	1963 Bond	1964 Legal Liquor
1957 Mayoralty					
1961 Mayoralty	.90				
1962 Bond	.91	.89			
1963 Bond	.92	.93	.94		
1964 Legal Liquor	.81	.86	.87	.81	

progressivism versus status quoism on physical elements, and sophisticated versus fundamentalist morality (particularly exemplified in the legal liquor vote).

This patterning is highlighted if we compare the 1961 vote for extreme segregationist and anti-coalition leader, Lester Maddox, with the vote for the three referenda. The coefficients are -.92, -.97, and -.88 for the 1962 bond, 1963 bond, and 1964 legal liquor referenda, respectively. Opposition to the moderate and persuasive political leadership in Atlanta--personified by Mayors Hartsfield and Allen--found its corollaries in opposition to measures designed to maintain the physical and "cultivated" properties of Atlanta. There is here a common thread of distrust and apprehension of what the new politics--with its increased taxes, equality for the races, and liberal sounding leadership--will do to the old modes of political, social, and economic life.

The authors of the Des Moines study, while not reporting on direct inter-election comparisons, infer little association between voting in nonpartisan elections and referenda. Although we have examined a restricted number of elections, our feeling is that the lines of congruence found here would also be found were we to look at other contests. The issue cleavages in the local political system transcend nonpartisan and referenda balloting.

Because we are particularly interested in the electoral alliances in local balloting, let us examine the associations between results in these elections with those in Democratic primaries and partisan contests. As Table 7 reveals, the moderate-progressive electoral coalition on local elections has its sequel in the Democratic primaries. The proportion of a precinct's vote going to moderate mayoralty candidates and progressive measures is directly and highly related to the proportion of the vote for the more

Table 7

INTERELECTION CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MODERATE AND PROGRESSIVE LOCAL VOTING AND "LIBERAL" VOTING IN DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES AND PARTISAN ELECTIONS*

	Local Voting				
	1957 Mayoralty	1961 Mayoralty	1962 Bond	1963 Bond	1964 Legal Liquor
Democratic Primaries**					
1954 Congressional	.65	.55	.57	.63	.51
1962 Congressional	.78	.78	.72	.84	.68
1962 Gubernatorial	.87	.86	.78	.86	.79
Partisan Elections					
1956 Congressional	-.88	-.81	-.81	-.84	-.77
1956 Presidential	-.84	-.78	-.79	-.82	-.74
1960 Presidential	-.51	-.55	-.49	-.52	-.51
1962 Congressional	-.15	-.35	-.82	.26	-.14

*The computed correlations are those between moderate and progressive voting in the local elections and with voting for the more liberal candidate in the Democratic primaries and the Democratic candidate in the partisan elections.

**Due in large part to the fact that Ernest Vandiver secured extremely high support from most precincts in the 1958 Gubernatorial primary, interelection comparisons resulted in insignificant coefficients and are not presented in this table.

liberal Democratic candidate. The open primary, of course, enhanced the possibility of such congruencies. Nevertheless, the similarities suggest that the Atlanta electorates are likely to perceive local, congressional, and state candidates and issues in a common framework, a framework which is essentially a matter of ideology and style rather than one of partisan or even factional loyalties.

Despite the high intercorrelations between what might be called "liberal" voting on local elections, referenda, and primaries, this propensity does not prevail in partisan elections. In three of the four partisan contests examined here the Democrats may be safely termed to have had the more liberal candidate--1956 and 1960 Presidential contests, and the 1962 Congressional. In 1956 the Republican aspirant--Randolph Thrower--was perhaps more liberal, or at least no more conservative, when contrasted with the arch-conservative incumbent, James Davis. If ideology was the most salient feature in all these elections, one would hypothesize a positive relationship between moderate-progressive voting on the local scene and voting for Democratic candidates in partisan elections. Clearly, just the opposite is the more customary state of affairs, although the generally lower negative correlations after 1956 suggest that the situation may be in the process of change. Customary equations of Democratic proclivities with moderate-progressive voting will not do here. The affiliation between local "reactionary" voting and national "liberal" voting is dramatically exposed in the correlations between the Maddox vote of 1961 and the 1956 and 1960 Presidential Democratic vote, with coefficients of .84 and .57 being produced in the respective elections.[24]

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[24]It was also found that voting percentages for liberal candidates in Democratic primaries show a decided negative correlation with the support received by Democratic candidates in partisan elections.

The presence of traditional Democratic loyalties appears as the most likely explanation of these seemingly incongruous findings. Party loyalty apparently either promotes a differential turnout of voters in the different elections or, and this is more probable, it acts to keep the traditional Democrats, many of whom vote conservatively in local and primary contests, in the Democratic fold in partisan conflicts. Conversely, it may be inferred that Republican-prone electorates, while more liberal on local and primary elections, identify with a brand of politics (Republican) at the national level which ordinarily pursues more conservative policies than does the Democratic party.

Status Polarization

Key elements of the voting alliances described previously have discernable socio-political characteristics which tend to bind them together. It should not be assumed, however, that the various members of these alliances exist in perfect political harmony. We have suggested that Negroes play an inordinately crucial role in the electoral coalitions. It may also be true that cooperation between Negro and high social class white electorates varies considerably depending upon the type of the election. We would infer, for example, that the cooperation between Negro and white groups is greatest when the issues are purely local and least when the issues are national. This is true because the alliance is, at best, an unnatural one depending for its existence upon the unique properties of Atlanta politics.

To examine this idea further, we have employed the index of class voting, a modification of a device first used by Robert Alford.[25] We have found it

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[25]Alford, op. cit., pp. 79-86

useful to think of the Atlanta precincts as falling into the following categories: predominantly lower class Negro, lower class white, middle class white, and upper class white. (See the footnote to Table 8 for an explanation of these categories.) We assume that elections can generate tension between these groupings, and that these tensions are expressed by divergent votes. The index of class voting was obtained simply by subtracting the mean vote for a liberal candidate on the part of one of the social categories from the mean vote of another category. For example, if Negro precincts give Mayor Allen 75 per cent of their vote and lower class white precincts give Allen 31, the difference of 44 is the index of class voting. the gher the index score, the greater the disparity between the voting preference of the two compared groups and the greater the presumed class antagonism between these groups. Table 8 arranges these index scores by election.

Quite clearly the greatest tension in Atlanta is between the lower class whites and the Negroes, followed closely by that between middle class whites and the Negroes. It can further be seen that the highest average indexes between the most antagonistic groups, Negroes and lower class whites, are produced by local elections. Conversely, the greatest cooperation between Negroes and upper class whites is produced by these local elections. Notice, too, that the cleavages between lower class and upper class whites are actually as great or greater in local elections as are those between Negroes and upper class whites. We might say, therefore, that the higher one goes on the class index, the smaller becomes the clash of voting between Negroes and whites. Further, the issues of local politics produce greater class antagonisms than do the issues of national politics. The patterns of conflict and cooperation are maximized by the conditions peculiar to local politics and minimized when non-local elements are introduced into the

Table 8

INDEX OF CLASS AND RACE VOTING BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS*

	Class-Race Index			Class Index		
	Lower Class Negro - Lower Class White	Lower Class Negro - Middle Class White	Lower Class Negro - Upper Class White	Lower Class White - Middle Class White	Lower Class White - Upper Class White	Middle Class White - Upper Class White
Partisan						
1956 Congressional	54	50	35	4	19	15
1956 Presidential	38	37	24	2	15	13
1960 Presidential	18	10	7	8	11	3
1962 Congressional	6	8	21	1	15	13
Democratic Primary						
1954 Congressional	30	25	30	5	.3	6
1958 Gubernatorial	8	10	18	3	10	7
1962 Gubernatorial	34	29	16	5	18	14
1962 Congressional	44	36	38	8	6	2
Mayoralty						
1957 Mayoralty	50	46	25	4	25	21
1961 Mayoralty	42	35	14	7	28	21
Referendum						
1962 Bond	32	28	11	4	21	17
1963 Bond	38	35	20	3	18	15
1964 Liquor	30	23	12	7	18	10

*For the purpose of this Table, all precincts with a Negro population of 50% or more are considered predominately Negro. Of the 17 precincts so designated, most range toward a high proportion of Negroes, as these figures indicate: 50-60% (2); 60-70% (1); 70-80% (3); 80-90% (4); 90-100% (7). On the basis of their Class Index scores, the 69 precincts were divided into three equal groups of lower, middle, and upper class. Under this scheme there emerged nine lower class white precincts (i.e., with a Negro population under 50%), 14 lower class Negro precincts, 20 middle class white precincts, three middle class Negro precincts (not included in the Table), and 23 upper class white precincts.

**Entries are the differences between the average votes of precincts being compared. The higher the entry the greater the antagonism or "class" component of the vote.

conflict. Finally, with the exception of the Negro--lower class and middle class white pairs in partisan elections, there is little to suggest that polarization has declined between 1954 and 1962.

We may contrast Atlanta with New Haven. Robert Dahl states that the issues of local politics are not such as to create status polarization. By studying the trend of local voting through time, Dahl concludes that the role of class in local politics is declining.[26] The authors of The American Voter have reached similar conclusions about the role of status in national politics.[27] However, they suggest that status polarization is less likely to decline in a metropolitan setting. Perhaps, therefore, the continuation of status polarization in Atlanta is not atypical. It is also true that in many communities (including Des Moines) the issues of urban politics seem to produce a fairly consistent status polarization.[28] Our findings are also consistent with those of Alford who maintains, in contrast to authors of The American Voter, that status polarization has not decreased in American politics.

The Changing Ethnic Vote and the Changing Political Parties

As noted previously, in Atlanta the so-called Negro vote in partisan elections has borne little resemblance to that found in most non-Southern areas. Predominantly Negro precincts returned, on the average, majorities

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[26]Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 59-62.

[27]Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), 346-349.

[28]See, for example, Henry J. Schmandt, Paul G. Steinbicker, and George D. Wendel, Metropolitan Reform in St. Louis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961).

for Republican candidates in the 1956 and 1960 Presidential balloting and in the 1956 Congressional election (and the simple correlations between % Negro and Republican voting were decidedly positive). But the mean presidential support dropped from 66% in 1956 to 54% in 1960. Moreover, in 1962 the Negro precincts returned a 70% mean vote for Charles Weltner, the moderate Democrat. This is a stark reversal from the 1956 election in which these same precincts cast a mean vote of almost 70% for the Republican aspirant, Randolph Thrower. There is little question then that Republicanism is on the wane and Democracy on the ascendancy among Atlanta's Negro population.

Behind this shifting is a change not so much in the posture of the Negroes themselves as in the changing nature of the GOP in the South and in the nation, and in the "opening to the left" of the Democratic party in the South. The congressional tussles of 1956 and 1962 illustrate the trends at work. In 1956 Randolph Thrower, the Republican, captured the bulk of the Negro precincts' vote both because he was a Republican and because he appeared as an alternative to the race-baiting incumbent, James Davis. In 1962 Davis was unseated in the Democratic primary (with the great help of the Negro vote) by moderate-sounding Charles Weltner. During the ensuing general election campaign Weltner had stout Republican opposition in the form of James O'Callaghan, but Weltner apparently impressed the Negro electorate as more in sympathy with their aims than did O'Callaghan.[29] Thus the Congressional Democrats by 1962 had the image of the more moderate party on civil rights. It is also significant that in the same year Leroy Johnson, a

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[29]For a fuller account of the 1962 congressional struggle in the Georgia fifth (Atlanta and environs) see Jennings and Zeigler, "Electoral Strategies and Voting Patterns in a Southern Congressional District," in Jennings and Zeigler, Essays in the Electoral Process (forthcoming).

Democrat, became the first Negro in the 20th century to be elected to the Georgia legislature. Johnson won over a strong Republican Negro, T. M. Alexander.

At the statewide level, Carl Sanders' campaign for governor in 1962 and his later performance in that office served to add further to the Negroes' reasons for perceiving a changing Democratic party in Georgia. Events at the State Republican convention in 1964 accentuated the rift between Negroes and the GOP. The Goldwater Republicans achieved a veritable "opening to the right." Negroes were virtually read out of the party and moderate Republicans (including Robert Snodgrass, former state chairman from Atlanta) received a sound thrashing. Concommitantly, the Sanders-moderate forces in the Democratic party moved to solidify their position with the Negroes by placing four from that race on the state delegation to the Democratic national convention. Barry Goldwater's nomination for the Presidency, and the other events surrounding the Republican convention, all but killed visible public support for the GOP in the Atlanta Negro community.[30]

Between 1956 and 1964, then, the Negroes moved toward a congruency between their liberal voting on local matters and their voting in partisan elections. By this we mean that the majorities turned in for the GOP candidates in 1956 and 1960 can hardly be interpreted as "liberal" votes on many of the issues most salient to Negroes, primarily those involving civil rights. Certainly the national Democratic party has been regarded as the more liberal party in regard to civil rights and in regard to issues involving government aid and protection for the "have-nots" in the nation. Predominantly Negro

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[30]Preliminary analysis of the 1964 vote indicated near unanimous balloting for Lyndon Johnson in the predominantly Negro precincts.

electorates in Atlanta presumably supported Eisenhower and Nixon for two major reasons. One was their traditional Republican loyalties buttressed by strong Republican leadership and organization at the local level. A second was the anomaly of voting Democratic when Southern Democrats appeared to be the worst political enemies of the Negro. The slogan of "a vote for the Democrats is a vote for Eastland" struck a responsive chord. These conditional factors have now gone through extensive permutations, as noted above. It is highly likely that the Atlanta Negro electorates will now be able to move to a point of convergency, in terms of issue-orientation, as they ballot in local nonpartisan elections, in referenda, in Democratic primaries, and in partisan elections.

As a corollary to these trends, voting patterns among white electorates have not been without their paradoxes. Lower class white precincts have consistently opposed progressive legislation and moderate political leadership at the local level and Democratic primaries while invariably returning sizeable majorities for Democrats in partisan matches. There are signs of change here too, however. For example, the average Democratic vote in lower class white precincts declined from 74% to 64% in the 1956 and 1962 Congressional elections, and from 74% to 65% in the 1956 and 1960 Presidential voting. Similar diminutions were recorded in middle class white precincts--70% to 63% and 73% to 58% in the Congressional and Presidential races, respectively. It may be that the Democratic opening to the left in the South will be achieved only at the expense of losing some lower and middle class white support.

Electoral Coalitions and Ruling Coalitions in Atlanta

Contrary to Floyd Hunter's well-known conclusions of a decade ago,[31]

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[31] Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

more recent investigations[32] have cast serious doubt on the validity of a monolithic, business-dominated, ruling elite for Atlanta. Instead, there has been posited a generally dominant ruling coalition composed of politico-governmental, business-civic, and Negro interests. The precise nature of the coalition varies from issue to issue, occasionally the coalition loses a skirmish, and the coalition operates under a continual strain. Yet a general ideology or consensus pervades the decision-making behavior of the influentials in this coalition. It is a consensus which eschews the politics of the old South while at the same time acknowledging that politics is the art of the possible, a consensus which takes some pride in the city as it stands but one which is future-oriented rather than atavistic. If there is anything the coalition fears most, it is seizure of the city government by what are called the "red neck," "wool hat" elements and their urbanized spokesman.

It is precisely because of this fear that the electoral coalition becomes crucial in understanding the structuring of power in Atlanta. Over the past decade the articulation of the electoral coalition with the ruling coalition has, for the most part, been rather pronounced. As we have seen, the support for moderate mayoralty candidates and "progressive" referenda have been very much a function of the Negro and the upper middle to upper class white electorates. In addition to providing the electoral base for moderate political leadership, these electorates also tend to provide, through

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[32]Principally, M. Kent Jennings, Community Influentials: The Elites of Atlanta (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). See also Douglass Cater, "Atlanta: Smart Politics and Good Relations," The Reporter (July, 1957), 18-21; Seymour Freedgood, "Life in Buckhead," Fortune (September, 1961), 108-14; and Jack L. Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 7 (May, 1963), 99-124.

various mechanisms, two components of the dominant coalition, namely, the business-civic and the Negro influentials.

The third major element of the coalition, politico-governmental influentails, has not failed to see the significance of the seemingly curious electoral coalition and its set of influentials. Candidates for city office must consider the potent power of the upper white class and Negro precincts in developing campaign strategy. Once elected the incumbent cannot risk seriously offending the electoral coalition. Thus policies are pursued which please the upper class "good government" forces and those who want a modern physical plant (partly because it is "good business") and some of life's amenities for the city. At the same time moderate policies are pursued in the tender arena of race relations, policies which are not completely satisfactory to the Negro community but are nevertheless gratifying when contrasted with the probable consequences of a "wool hat" administration. It was no coincidence, incidentally, that Mayor Ivan Allen was practically the lone Southerner to testify on Capitol Hill in favor of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By the same token administrative officials are also conscious of the electoral alliance, particularly as it is manifested in interest group behavior. All of this is not to say that the politico-governmental influentials are merely following, rather than leading these potent constituencies. Certainly, Mayors Hartsfield and Allen have shaped, as they have been shaped by, the preferences of components of the electoral and ruling coalitions. There is a reciprocal relationship, sometimes delicate and sometimes crude, among the elements of the coalition.

In Atlanta the electoral tandem of Negro and upper class white voters has produced, and been produced by, a similar coalition in the upper reaches of the decision-making structure. To a great extent the coalitions at both levels are tacit rather than formal. For the most part, during the last

decade the dual coalitions have prevailed on the crucial issues facing the community. But the relationship is certainly subject to renegotiation, if not cancellation. If the Negroes move toward the Democratic party in partisan politics while the upper class whites retain or increase their Republican leanings, it is possible that one link between the two subcommunities may weaken. It may be that the intrusion of visible partisan differences will dampen the pre-existing understanding between the two on local matters. On the other hand, as long as upper class Republican and Democratic partisans--expecially the former--subscribe to progressive politics at the local level, the electoral coalition will probably persist. And so long as this coalition prevails in decisive elections, it seems likely that the ruling coalition will also remain intact.